Author: Richard Jones

This is the second post in a series of three, considering the background to the forthcoming UK Government Semiconductor Strategy.

In the first part, The UK’s place in the semiconductor world, I discussed the new global environment, in which a tenser geopolitical situation has revived a policy climate around the world which is much more favourable to large scale government interventions in the industry, I sketched the global state of the semiconductor industry and tried to quantify the UK’s position in the semiconductor world.

Here, I discuss the past and future of semiconductors, mentioning some of the important past interventions by governments around the world that have shaped the current situation, and I speculate on where the industry might be going in the future.

Finally, in the third part, I’ll ask where this leaves the UK, and speculate on what its semiconductor strategy might seek to achieve.

Active industrial policy in the history of semiconductors

The history of the global semiconductor industry involves a dance between governments around the world and private companies. In contrast to the conviction of the predominantly libertarian ideology of Silicon Valley, the industry wouldn’t have come into existence and developed in the form we now know without a series of major, and expensive, interventions by governments across the world.

But, to caricature the claims of some on the left, there is an idea that it was governments that created the consumer electronic products we all rely on, and private industry has simply collected the profits. This view doesn’t recognise the massive efforts private industry has made, spending huge sums on the research and development needed to perfect manufacturing processes and bring them to market. Taking the USA alone, in 2022 US the government spent $6 billion on semiconductor R&D, compared to private industry’s $50.2 billion.

The semiconductor industry emerged in the 1960s in the USA, and in its early days more than half of its sales were to the US government. This was an early example of what we would now call “mission driven” innovation, motivated by a “moonshot project”. The “moonshot project” of the 1960s was driven by a very concrete goal – to be able to drop a half-tonne payload anywhere on the earth’s surface, with a precision measured in hundreds of meters.

Semiconductors were vital to achieve this goal – the first mass-produced computers based on integrated circuits were developed as the guidance systems of Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles. Of course, despite its military driving force, this “moonshot” produced important spin-offs – the development of space travel to the point at which a series of manned missions to the moon were possible, and increasing civilian applications of the more much cheaper, more powerful and more reliable computers that solid-state electronics made possible.

The USA is where the semiconductor industry started, but it played a central role in three East Asian development miracles. The first to exploit this new technology was Japan. While the USA was exploiting the military possibilities of semiconductors, Japan focused on their application in consumer goods.

By the early 1980’s, though, Japanese companies were producing memory chips more efficiently than the USA, while Nikon took a leading position in the photolithography equipment used to make integrated circuits. In part the Japanese competitive advantage was driven by their companies’ manufacturing prowess and their attentiveness to customer needs, but the US industry complained, not entirely without justification, that their success was built on the theft of intellectual property, access to unfairly cheap capital, the protection of home markets by trade barriers, and government funded research consortia bringing together leading companies. These are recurring ingredients of industrial policy as executed by East Asian developmental states, first executed successfully in Taiwan and in Korea, and now being applied on a continental scale by China.

An increasingly paranoid USA’s response to this threat from Japan to its technological supremacy in semiconductors was to adopt some industrial strategy measures itself. The USA relaxed its stringent anti-trust laws to allow US companies to collaborate in R&D through a consortium called SEMATECH, half funded by the federal government. Sematech was founded in 1987, and in the first 5 years of its operation was supported by $500 m of Federal funding, leading to some new self-confidence for the US semiconductor industry.

Meanwhile both Korea and Taiwan had identified electronics as a key sector through which to pursue their export-focused development strategies. For Taiwan, a crucial institution was the Industrial Technology Research Institute, in Hsinchu. Since its foundation in 1973, ITRI had been instrumental in supporting Taiwan’s industrial base in moving closer to the technology frontier.

In 1985 the US-based semiconductor executive Morris Chang was persuaded to lead ITRI, using this position to create a national semiconductor industry, in the process spinning out the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. TSMC was founded as a pure-play foundry, contract manufacturing integrated circuits designed by others and focusing on optimising manufacturing processes. This approach has been enormously successful, and has led TSMC to its globally leading position.

Over the last decade, China has been aggressively promoting its own semiconductor industry. The 2015 “Made in China 2025” identified semiconductors as a key sector for the development of a high tech manufacturing sector, setting the target of 70% self-sufficiency by 2025, and a dominant position in global markets by 2045.

Cheap capital for developing semiconductor manufacturing was provided through the state-backed National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, amounting to some $47 bn (though it seems the record of this fund has been marred by corruption allegations). The 2020 directive “Several Policies for Promoting the High-quality Development of the Integrated Circuit Industry and Software Industry in the New Era” reinforced these goals with a package of measures including tax breaks, soft loans, R&D and skills policies.

While the development of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan and Korea was generally welcomed by policy-makers in the West, a changing geopolitical climate has led to much more anxiety about China’s aspirations. The USA has responded by an aggressive programme of bans on the exports of semiconductor manufacturing tools, such as high end lithography equipment, to China, and has persuaded its allies in Japan and the Netherlands to follow suit.

Industrial policy in support of the semiconductor industry hasn’t been restricted to East Asia. In Europe a key element of support has been the development of research institutes bringing together consortia of industries and academia; perhaps the most notable of these is IMEC in Belgium, while the cluster of companies that formed around the electronics company Phillips in Eindhoven now includes the dominant player in equipment for extreme UV lithography, AMSL.

In Ireland, policies in support of inward investment, including both direct and indirect financial inducements, and the development of institutions to support skills innovation, persuaded Intel to base their European operations in Ireland. This has resulted in this small, formerly rural, nation becoming the second largest exporter of integrated circuits in Europe.

In the UK, government support for the semiconductor industry has gone through three stages. In the postwar period, the electronics industry was a central part of the UK’s Cold War “Warfare State”, with government institutions like the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment at Malvern carrying out significant early research in compound semiconductors and optoelectronics.

The second stage saw a more conscious effort to support the industry. In the mid-to-late 1970’s, a realisation of the potential importance of integrated circuits coincided with a more interventionist Labour government. The government, through the National Enterprise Board, took a stake in a start-up making integrated circuits in South Wales, Inmos. The 1979 Conservative government was much less interventionist than its predecessor, but two important interventions were made in the early 1980’s.

The first was the Alvey Programme, a joint government/private sector research programme launched in 1983. This was an ambitious programme of joint industry/government research, worth £350m, covering a number of areas in information and communication technology. The results of this programme were mixed; it played a significant role in the development of mobile telephony, and laid some important foundations for the development of AI and machine learning. In semiconductors, however, the companies it supported, such as GEC and Plessey, were unable to develop a lasting competitive position in semiconductor manufacturing and no longer survive.

The second intervention arose from a public education campaign ran by the BBC; a small Cambridge based microcomputer company, Acorn, won the contract to supply BBC-branded personal computers in support of this programme. The large market created in this way later gave Acorn the headroom to move into the workstation market with reduced instruction set computing architectures, from which was spun-out the microprocessor design house ARM.

In the third stage, the UK government adopted a market fundamentalist position. This involved a withdrawal from government support for applied research and the run-down of government laboratories like RSRE, and a position of studied indifference about the acquisition of UK technology firms by overseas rivals. Major UK electronics companies, such as GEC and Plessey, collapsed following some ill-judged corporate misadventures. Inmos was sold, first to Thorn, then to the Franco- Italian group, SGS Thomson. Inmos left a positive legacy, with many who had worked there going on to participate in a Bristol based cluster of semiconductor design houses. The Inmos manufacturing site survives as Newport Wafer Fab, currently owned by the Dutch-based, Chinese owned company Nexperia, though its future is uncertain following a UK government ruling that Nexperia should divest its shareholding on national security grounds.

This focus on the role of interventions by governments across the world at crucial moments in the development of the industry shouldn’t overshadow the huge investments in R&D made by private companies around the world. A sense of the scale of these investments is given by the figure below.

R&D expenditure in the microelectronics industry, showing Intel’s R&D expenditure, and a broader estimate of world microelectronics R&D including semiconductor companies and equipment manufacturers. Data from the “Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find?” dataset on Chad Jones’s website. Inflation corrected using the US GDP deflator.

The exponential increase in R&D spending up to 2000 was driven by a similarly exponential increase in worldwide semiconductor sales. In this period, there was a remarkable virtuous circle of increasing sales, leading to increasing R&D, leading in turn to very rapid technological developments, driving further sales growth. In the last two decades, however, growth in both sales and in R&D spending has slowed down

Global semiconductor sales in billions of dollars. Plot from “Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects” (2019), National Academies Press, which uses data from the Semiconductor Industry Association.

Possible futures for the semiconductor industry

The rate of technological progrèss in integrated circuits between 1984 and 2003 was remarkable and unprecedented in the history of technology. This drove an exponential increase in microprocessor computing power, which grew by more than 50% a year. This growth arose from two factors, As is well-known, the number of transistors on a silicon chip grew exponentially, as predicted by Moore’s Law. This was driven by many unsung, but individually remarkable, technological innovations in lithography (to name just a couple of examples, phase shift lithography, and chemically amplified resists), allowing smaller and smaller features to be manufactured.

The second factor is less well known – by a phenomenon known as Dennard scaling, as transistors get smaller they operate faster. Dennard scaling reached its limit around 2004, as the heat generated by microprocessors became a limiting factor. After 2004, microprocessor computer power increased at a slower rate, driven by increasing the number of cores and parallelising operations, resulting in rates of increase around 23% a year. This approach itself ran into diminishing returns after 2011.

Currently we are seeing continued reductions in feature sizes, together with new transistor designs, such as finFETs, which in effect allow more transistors to be fitted into a given area by building them side-on. But further increases in computer power are increasingly being driven by optimising processor architectures for specific tasks, for example graphical processing units and specialised chips for AI, and by simply multiplying the number of microprocessors in the server farms that underlie cloud computing.

Slowing growth in computer power. The growth in processor performance since 1988. Data from figure 1.1 in Computer Architecture: A Quantitative Approach (6th edn) by Hennessy & Patterson.

It’s remarkable that, despite the massive increase in microprocessor performance since the 1970’s, and major innovations in manufacturing technology, the underlying mode of operation of microprocessors remains the same. This is known by the shorthand of CMOS, for Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor. Logic gates are constructed from complementary pairs of field effect transistors consisting of a channel in heavily doped silicon, whose conductance is modulated by the application of an electric field across an insulating oxide layer from a metal gate electrode.

CMOS isn’t the only way of making a logic gate, and it’s not obvious that it is the best one. One severe limitation on our computing is its energy consumption. This matters at a micro level; the heat generated by a laptop or mobile phone is very obvious, and it was problems of heat dissipation that underlay the slowdown in the growth in microprocessor power around 2004. It’s also significant at a global level, where the energy used by cloud computing is becoming a significant share of total electricity consumption.

There is a physical lower limit to the energy that computing uses – this is the Landauer limit on the energy cost of a single logical operation, a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics. Our current technology consumes more than three orders of magnitude more energy than is theoretically possible, so there is room for improvement. Somewhere in the universe of technologies that don’t exist, but are physically possible, lies a superior computing technology to CMOS.

Many alternative forms of computing have been tried out in the laboratory. Some involve different materials to silicon: compound semiconductors or new forms of carbon like nanotubes and graphene. In some, the physical embodiment of information is, not electric charge, but spin. The idea of using individual molecules as circuit elements – molecular electronics – has a long and somewhat chequered history. None of these approaches has yet made a significant commercial impact; incumbent technologies are always hard to displace. CMOS and its related technologies amount to a deep nanotechnology implemented at a massive scale; the huge investment in this technology has in effect locked us into a particular technology path.

There are alternative, non-semiconductor based, computing paths that are worth mentioning, because they may become important in the future. One is to copy biology; our own brains deliver enormous computing power at remarkably low energy cost, with an architecture that is very different from the von Neumann architecture that human-built computers follow, and a basic unit that is molecular. Various radical approaches to computing take some inspiration from biology, whether that is the new architectures for CMOS that underlie neuromorphic computing, or entirely molecular approaches based on DNA.

Quantum computing, on the other hand, offers the potential for another exponential leap forward in computing power – in principle. Many practical barriers remain before this potential can be turned into practise, however, and this is a topic for another discussion. Suffice it to say that, on a timescale of a decade or so, quantum computers will not replace conventional computers for anything more than some niche applications, and in any case they are likely to be deployed in tandem with conventional high performance computers, as accelerators for specific tasks, rather than as general purpose computers.

Finally, I should return to the point that semiconductors aren’t just valuable for computing; the field of power electronics is likely to become more and more important as we move to a net zero energy system. We will need a much more distributed and flexible energy grid to accommodate decentralised renewable sources of electricity, and this needs solid-state power electronics capable of handling very high voltages and currents – think of replacing house-size substations by suitcase-size solid-state transformer. Widespread uptake of electric vehicles and the need for widely available rapid charging infrastructures will place further demands on power electronics. Silicon is not suitable for these applications, which require wide-band gap semiconductors such as diamond, silicon carbide and other compound semiconductors.

Sources

Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology, by Chris Miller, is a great overview of the history of this technology.

Semiconductors in the UK: Searching for a strategy. Geoffrey Owen, Policy Exchange, 2022. Very good on the history of the UK industry.

To Every Thing There is a Season – lessons from the Alvey Programme for Creating an Innovation Ecosystem for Artificial Intelligence, by Luke Georghiou. Reflections on the Alvey Programme by one of the researchers who carried out its official evaluation.

Are Ideas getting hard to find, Bloom, Jones, van Reenan and Webb. American Economic Review (2020). An influential paper on diminishing rates of return on R&D, taking the semiconductor industry as a case study.

“Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects (2019), National Academies Press.

Up next: What should the UK do about semiconductors? Part 3: towards a UK semiconductor strategy

1. On the discrepancy between ONS and HMRC estimates of business R&D.

In the UK, there are two ways in which the total amount of business R&D (BERD) is measured. The Office for National Statistics conducts an annual survey of business, in which a sample of firms is asked to report how much R&D has been carried out. Meanwhile firms can report what R&D they have carried out to the taxman – HMRC – in order to claim R&D tax credits, which according to circumstances can be a reduction of their liability for corporation tax, or an actual cash payment. In recent years, the two measures of business R&D have increasingly diverged, with substantially more R&D expenditure being claimed for tax credits than is reported in the BERD survey.

The divergence between HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and Business enterprise research and development (BERD) estimates of research and development (R&D) expenditure. Source: ONS.

The ONS has been looking into this divergence, and has recently published a note which concludes that the primary reason for the discrepancy is an undersampling of the small business population. On this basis, it has adjusted its previous estimate for business R&D substantially upwards – in 2020, the revision is from £26.9 bn to £43 bn. In future years, ONS will introduce improved, more robust, methodologies that will include a wider range of SMEs in the sample they survey.

In principle, there could be two possible causes for the growing divergence between the total business R&D recorded by the ONS BERD survey and the amounts underlying claims to HMRC for R&D tax credits:

a. The incentives of R&D tax credits have caused businesses to stretch the definition of R&D so they can get money for activities that are part of normal business (e.g. market research, working out how to use new equipment). This is exacerbated by the growth of an industry of consultants offering their services to firms to help them claim this money (in return for a %).

b. The ONS survey of firms (the BERD survey) has systematically undersampled a population of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which turn out to have more R&D activity than previously believed.

In favour of (a) – the discrepancy between the two measures hasn’t been entirely static, as you’d expect if it was simply a question of missing a population of firms who had always been doing R&D at a constant rate, but who have only just been discovered. The gap has risen from £7.3 bn in 2014, to £16.6 bn in 2018. So for this explanation to hold, we need to believe not only that there is an existing population of SMEs carrying out R&D that has previously been undetected, but that this population has been substantially growing. Is R&D growth in the SME sector at a rate of £2.3 bn a year plausible? I’m not sure.

Moreover, the incentives for stretching the definition of R&D to claim free money are obvious. HMRC accept that some claims are outright fraudulent, estimating that 4.9% of the cost of the scheme is attributable to error and fraud. But there’s a big grey area between outright fraud and creative interpretation of the “Frascati” definitions of R&D.

ONS argues in favour of (b), backing this up with a detailed comparison of the microdata from the ONS survey and HMRCs returns. To add some anecdotal support, work in Greater Manchester in collaboration with a data science consultancy does seem to have identified a population of innovative SMEs in GM which has previously remained invisible, in the sense that they are firms who don’t engage with universities or with Innovate UK.

In truth, the real answer is probably some mixture of the two. We’ll learn more once the new methodology has produced a complete data set identifying the sectors and geographical locations of R&D performing firms.

2. Policy implications

Figures for total R&D spending (including both business and public sector R&D) as a proportion of GDP provide a useful measure of the overall research intensity of the UK economy and form the basis for international comparisons. The previous figure for R&D intensity – about 1.7% – put the UK between the Czech Republic and Italy. The new estimates suggest a revised figure of 2.4%, which would put the UK roughly on a par with Belgium, slightly above France, but behind the USA and Germany, and still a long way behind leaders like Korea and Israel. Of course, when making these international comparisons, a natural question is how accurate are the R&D statistics in these other countries. This is a good question that could be investigated by OECD, who collate international R&D statistics.

The international comparison has driven a target for R&D intensity that the government committed to – that it would achieve an R&D intensity equal to the OECD average. At the time when the target was formulated this average was indeed equal to 2.4%. However, the OECD average is a moving target since other countries are increasing their own R&D – it’s now above 2.5%. One can also ask whether a target to achieve international mediocrity is stretching enough.

There are more fundamental issues with the idea of having an R&D intensity target at all. One quirk of expressing the target as a % of GDP is that one can achieve it by driving down the denominator; certainly GDP growth in the UK has been disappointing for the last 12 years, as the Prime Minister has reminded us. One could argue that a numerical target for R&D is arbitrary and one should concentrate more on the instrumental outcomes one wants to achieve from the research – higher growth, more rapid and cost effective progress towards net zero, better population health outcomes etc. As I wrote myself recently in my survey of the UK R&D landscape:

“An R&D target should be thought of not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. We should start by asking what kind of economy do we need, if we are to meet the big strategic goals that I discussed in the first part of this series. Given a clearer view about that, we’ll have a better understanding the necessary fraction of national resources that we should devote to research and development. I don’t know if that would produce the exact figure of 2.4%, but I wouldn’t be surprised if it was significantly higher.”

Perhaps the most problematic implication of a BERD upgrade is the enduring puzzle that productivity growth remains very slow. This extra, previously unrecorded R&D, doesn’t seem to have translated into productivity growth as we would expect.

This raises the broader question of why we think the government should support business R&D at all, whether through R&D tax credits or through other means. The classical argument is that private sector R&D leads to wider benefits from the economy that aren’t captured by the firms that make the investments, so in the absence of government firms will invest less in R&D that would be socially optimal. This leads to the question of whether all kinds of R&D, in all kinds of company (e.g. large and small) lead to equal degrees of wider spillover effects (and the same question can be asked of intangible investments more generally). If the kinds of R&D that are now being revealed with the new methodology do have smaller spillovers than other types, one might ask what kind of interventions could improve those.

3. Political implications

As others have observed, the chief danger of the revision is that in times of fiscal retrenchment, the government could declare “mission accomplished” and delay or cancel increases in public R&D. This danger seems very real given the direction of the current government. The opposition, on the other hand, has called for an R&D target of 3% of GDP, so there is plenty of room there.

There is an argument that the revision suggests that public R&D is even more effective than we thought in generating private sector R&D – the leverage effect is stronger than we thought. For this argument to be convincing, we’d need to understand the degree to which the companies doing this R&D are connected to the wider innovation system. But it doesn’t then support the wider argument for R&D as a driver of productivity growth – we have the R&D intensity we aspired to, so why aren’t we seeing the benefits in the productivity figures?

There are possible arguments that our focus in business R&D has been too much on the big incumbents – the GSKs and Rolls Royces – whose R&D is very visible. On the other hand, this connects to the long-running question of why we don’t have more of those big incumbents? At this point, we should recall that there are only two UK companies in the world top-100 of R&D performers – AstraZeneca and GSK. So why aren’t some of these previously unseen R&D intensive companies scaling up to become the new big players?

There is much yet to understand here.

In the first part of this series attempting to sum up the issues facing UK science and innovation policy, I tried to set the context by laying out the wider challenges the UK government faces, asking what problems we need our science and innovation system to contribute to solving.

In the second part of the series, I posed some of the big questions about how the UK’s science and innovation system works, considering how R&D intensive the UK economy should be, the balance between basic and applied research, and the geographical distribution of R&D.

In the third part, I discussed the institutional landscape of R&D in the UK, looking at where R&D gets done in the UK.

In the fourth part, looking at the funding system, I considered who pays for R&D, and how decisions are made about what R&D to do.

In the fifth part, I looked in more detail at UK Research and Innovation, the government’s main agency for funding academic science.

In the sixth part, I looked at the other routes that the UK government funds R&D, particularly through government departments.

In this, the final section of my survey of the routes by which the UK government funds R&D, I turn to two areas with the most uncertainty. The first of these is the future of the UK’s participation in the EU Horizon programme. I’ll discuss the distinctive roles of EU funding, and what might replace it in the increasingly likely scenario that the UK is not able to associate. The second is the new agency the Advanced Research and Invention Agency, set up by Act of Parliament in early 2022, and currently just establishing itself; here I’ll suggest some early thoughts about the role this might play in the overall system.

7.1. Horizon Europe – past participation and future prospects of association

In the past, the UK government has funded R&D indirectly through the EU Horizon programme, which provided research grants to UK researchers in HE and to UK businesses, often as part of larger collaborative programmes with researchers and businesses from elsewhere in Europe. EU research funding to UK universities and businesses has been on a very material scale; of course ultimately this money came from the UK’s contributions to the overall budget. In the UK’s national accounts, this was accounted for by a notional cost that reached a high point of £1.46 billion in 2019.

Because EU research money was allocated competitively, there wasn’t a direct relationship between the money the UK put into the budget and the research money the UK received. In fact, because of the UK’s relative research strength, the UK got back significantly more money than it put in. According to an analysis of the 2007-2013 cycle, the UK’s indicative contribution to the budget was €5.4 bn, but it received €8.8 bn of funding for research, development and innovation.

After the UK decided to leave the EU, a consensus developed that the UK should seek to stay associated with the EU’s R&D programmes, an option already taken up by other non-member states such as Switzerland, Norway and Israel. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK contained a draft protocol establishing the UK’s association with Horizon Europe (with the exception of the European Innovation Council). “The Parties affirm that the draft protocols set out below have been agreed in principle and will be submitted to the Specialised Committee on Participation in Union Programmes for discussion and adoption. The United Kingdom and European Union reserve their right to reconsider participation in the programmes, activities and services listed in Protocols [I and II] before they are adopted since the legal instruments governing the Union programmes and activities may be subject to change. The draft protocols may also need to be amended to ensure their compliance with these instruments as adopted.”

If the UK does associate, it will need to contribute financially to the Horizon Europe programme. In contrast to the situation when the UK was a member state, when it received more back from EU R&D programmes than it notionally contributed, as an associated country it would need to cover not only the full cost of R&D activities funded in the UK through Horizon UK, but also a substantial additional overhead. The money for this was set aside in the 2021 Comprehensive Spending Review; it amounted to £1.3 bn in 21/22, rising to £2.1bn 24/25.

As I write, the draft protocol has not yet been finalised by the EU side, and given the wider political situation, it seems increasingly unlikely that it will be finalised any time soon. The UK government made a commitment at the time of the 2021 CSR that, in the event of the UK not associating, the money set aside would be retained in the science budget, redeployed in a set of programmes that reproduced the benefits of EU association – the so-called “Plan B”.

On July 20th, the government released more details of “Plan B”, restating the commitment to use the Horizon money for alternative science programmes. “In the event we are unable to associate, we will use the funding allocated to Horizon Europe at the 2021 Spending Review to build on our existing R&D programmes with flagship new domestic and international research and innovation investments to support top talent, drive end-to-end innovation and foster international collaboration with EU and global partners.”

7.2. The Three Pillars of Horizon Europe

The EU’s R&D programmes are agreed for seven year cycles; the current cycle – Horizon Europe – assigns €95.5 billion for the period from 2021-27. The overall goals of the programme are specified in terms of the strategic goals of the European Union – tackling climate change, meeting the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, and boosting the EU’s competitiveness and economic growth.

To support these broad goals, Horizon Europe supports three “Pillars”. The first of these is “Excellent Science”. This includes the European Research Council, together with schemes supporting early career researchers and collaborative research and training for PhD students. The European Research Council supports investigator led basic science and humanities research; this has a very high reputation in the scientific community, for reasons I’ll discuss below. However, it is important to remember that it is a relatively small part of the overall Horizon programme – it’s been allocated €16 bn in the current cycle.

The second pillar is for “Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness”, which supports research collaborations built around sectors, challenges and missions. These typically involve both academic and industrial researchers in multinational collaborations.

The third pillar is new to the current cycle – “Innovative Europe” is focused on developing more high tech start-up companies, with a new “European Innovation Council”, a “European Institute of Innovation and Technology”, and support for regional innovation ecosystems. In the event of association, the UK will opt out of the “EIC accelerator” – that part of pillar 3 which provides investment funding to companies.

Underpinning the whole programme is an aspiration to create a “European Research Area”, with free and easy movement of people and research groups across the continent, lubricated by exchange schemes for scientists (particularly at early career stages) and cross-border transferability of grants. In the past the UK has benefitted from this, with a scientific and institutional infrastructure that has made the country an attractive destination for scientists from other European countries.

7.3. Why scientists love the European Research Council

Amongst elite scientists in the UK, the main driving force for an enthusiasm for the UK to associate with Horizon Europe is to be able to continue to participate in the European Research Council. This, in part, simply reflects how successful the UK has been in winning competitive funding through this route. For example, in the competition for the most established researchers – the Advanced Grants, which provide €2.5 million over 5 years for a single investigator and their team – UK based researchers won 22% of all grants between 2008 and 2020, compared to 16% and 12% to the two next most successful nations, Germany and France respectively (source).

But beyond the self-interest of UK scientists, why is the European Research Council so highly thought of? It has a clarity of purpose, with a single-minded focus on investigator driven basic research, with no predetermined priorities, but with an emphasis on supporting high risk/high gain proposals. It is correctly perceived as highly competitive, attracting proposals from the most outstanding researchers across Europe – currently its grantees have won nine Nobel prizes. Its decisions are made by a peer review process which is widely considered to be fair, rigorous and well executed.

Peer review isn’t easy to do well. In section 2 of this series, in discussing a possible world-wide slow-down in scientific productivity, I mentioned the suggestion that peer review can lead to conservatism and can suppress radical new ideas. In section 5, I suggested that there was a lack of confidence in the scientific community in the credibility of the peer review systems that the UK Research Councils run. In the light of these concerns, it’s worth asking what the European Research Council gets right about peer review (while recognising that even the ERC’s process is probably not perfect, for example in tricky areas like handling highly interdisciplinary proposals).

In my opinion, there’s nothing magic about the ERC’s approach to peer review. The process involves committees of experts (and, to declare a personal interest, I recently served on the expert panel for Advanced Grants in my own field of Condensed Matter Physics). Those panels invite written comments on proposals from worldwide specialists they choose for their appropriateness to judge individual proposals. In a final meeting, the panels consider the referees’ reports, with interviews with the proposers to give them the chance to respond to criticisms, and come to a collective judgement about which proposals to give highest priority for funding.

What makes this work? The starting point must be high quality panels, with a good range of expertise, the ability to take a broad view, and an effective chair. At its best, the ERC has developed a virtuous circle, in which the high quality of the proposals means that outstanding scientists are prepared to put the time in to serve on panels, while in turn it is the credibility of the process that attracts applications from the best scientists from across a whole continent. It is the researchers on the panels who select the remote referees, using their knowledge of the field to select the most appropriate ones, and then applying their own critical scientific judgement to resolve any discrepancies and differences of opinion between referees. Sufficient time is set aside for in-depth decisions – a single proposal round will involve two panel meetings, each of which can take up to a week.

Meanwhile administrative support is provided by high quality subject specialists working full-time for ERC as programme managers. In the UK, the research councils were forced to make serious cuts on their office staff in the early 2010s, because it was mistakenly believed that these subject specialists represented an administrative overhead, rather than being a precondition for the most effective allocation of R&D funding. This mistake should not be repeated (and, indeed, should be corrected).

7.4. “Plan B” for non-association

The “Plan B” document published this July (Supporting UK R&D and collaborative research beyond European programmes) usefully sets out some principles for how the money set aside for association with Horizon Europe will be used in the event that association doesn’t materialise. But details of implementation remain sketchy, and delivery may prove challenging to the existing agencies and bodies that will be charged with executing these schemes.

These agencies are mostly in UKRI, with a particularly important role for Innovate UK, with the National Academies potentially playing a role in the “talent” schemes. These are largely fellowships at various career stages, that will be in part fill some of the role of the European Research Council, though without the benefits of the institutional strength that ERC has developed, as outlined in the last section.

The emphasis of measures taken so far has been on stabilising the system, in particular keeping in the UK outstanding scientists who have been awarded ERC grants, but who can’t take them up without moving to an EU member state. The commitment has been made to guarantee the funding of any Horizon UK grant awarded to UK based researchers for the lifetime of the grant. It is going to be important to ensure that this happens without bureaucratic hurdles, in perception or reality, as HE institutions in the EU will be making energetic efforts to recruit these researchers.

The last point emphasises the importance of making sure the UK remains an attractive destination for overseas scientists, and promoting researcher mobility to make sure that the UK is centrally integrated in international networks of expertise. The plan here remains vague, but states the intention to fund “bottom-up collaborations with researchers in partner countries around the globe; multilateral and bilateral collaborations; and Third Country Participation in Horizon Europe”.

Measures for supporting business R&D will be funnelled through Innovate UK; it seems these will largely build on existing schemes. The aim is to support both domestic and international collaborations. The international dimension will be particularly important in supporting high technology SMEs to participate in trans-national supply chains and innovation systems, many of which, of course, involve EU member states.

The local and regional dimension of support for innovation systems is also important. EU funding – including structural funding as well as direct R&D funding – has been important in developing clusters in economically lagging parts of the UK, such as Northern England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Shared Prosperity Fund is likely to offer only a partial substitute for EU structural funds, so it is encouraging to see a commitment to drive “the development of emerging clusters throughout the UK”, and the statement that the “Plan B” portfolio “will support our mission of levelling up the UK and build on our commitment to increase domestic R&D investment outside of the Greater Southeast by at least a third over the spending review period and at least 40% by 2030.”

Moving forward with the association of the UK with Horizon Europe would seem to require a breakthrough in wider EU/UK relations that currently doesn’t seem very likely. In the absence of such a breakthrough, the priority needs to be for the new administration to confirm the funding of plan B, and move very quickly to turn what are currently rather high level plans into deliverable programmes.

7.5 The Advanced Research and Invention Agency (ARIA)

The most recent addition to the UK’s R&D funding landscape is the new funding agency, the Advanced Research and Invention Agency. This was established by an Act of Parliament, finalised in early 2022. It was a personal priority of the Prime Minister’s former chief advisor, Dominic Cummings, who emphasised the need to have a funding agency with the freedom to take big risks, modelled loosely on the US agency ARPA. ARPA was set up in the late 1950’s to ensure technological supremacy for the US armed forces, and research it supported has underpinned world-changing technological innovations such as the internet, the satellite location system that GPS evolved from, and stealth aircraft.

The Act of Parliament establishing ARIA does indeed give a huge amount of latitude in defining its goals and modes of operation; much is left to the discretion of the CEO and the board. The major lever the government retains is the level of funding allocated; the initial commitment is to spend £800m by 24/25. This is a relatively small amount seen in the context of the £20 billion total R&D budget planned for 24/25. Nonetheless, given that we’re already halfway through 22/23, that leaves only two years to get some entirely new programmes off the ground.

The Act does give the Secretary of State powers of Intervention on grounds of national security, and it is easy to imagine that these could be used quite widely. Nonetheless, there is some irony in the way the independence from government that was taken away from the Research Councils has been given to this new agency.

Given that the appointments of the Chief Executive and Chair have only relatively recently been announced, there is not yet clarity about what the new agency will do. I outlined my own views about how such an agency should operate in a piece from January 2020, UK ARPA: an experiment in science policy.

As I wrote then, “If we want to support visionary research, whose applications may be 10-20 years away, we should be prepared to be innovative – even experimental – in the way we fund research. And just as we need to be prepared for research not to work out as planned, we should be prepared to take some risks in the way we support it, especially if the result is less bureaucracy. There are some lessons to take from the long (and, it needs to be stressed, not always successful) history of ARPA/DARPA. To start with its operating philosophy, an agency inspired by ARPA should be built around the vision of the programme managers. But the operating philosophy needs to be underpinned by as enduring mission and clarity about who the primary beneficiaries of the research should be. And finally, there needs to be a deep understanding of how the agency fits into a wider innovation landscape.”

My starting point would be to recognise that pluralism & diversity in funding agencies is a good in itself, and we need to innovate in the way we support innovation. ARPA at its best represented an approach to funding where the focus was on the programme manager – or better, programme leader as the creative force. These leaders should be tasked with assembling and orchestrating teams of talented people to achieve ambitious programmes with concrete goals.

The archetype of the visionary leader is perhaps J.C.R. Licklider, who accepted a position with ARPA in 1962, because if offered an opportunity to realise his vision of computer networking. The research he funded at ARPA laid many of the foundations of modern computing, including the principles of networking that led to the internet, and the principles of human/computer interaction that were further developed a the XEROX PARC laboratory to give us the graphical interfaces that we all take for granted together.

ARPA benefited from a complete clarity of mission – its role was to ensure that the US armed forces enjoyed technological supremacy over any potential rival. That makes clear who its beneficiaries should be – the US Armed Forces.

What should ARIA’s mission be, and who are its beneficiaries? This remains to be decided, but from my perspective it is important to make clear that its primary beneficiaries should neither be the academic community, nor industry. Both communities will be crucial in delivering the mission, but it should not be primarily for their benefit. Instead, I believe that ARIA should focus on one, or a subset of one, of the important strategic goals that the UK state currently faces, as I outlined in the first part of this series.

For me, the most obvious candidate is the challenge of driving down the cost of achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions to a point where the global transition can be driven by economics, rather than politics.

Up next…

In the next and final part of this series, I will attempt to sum up, with some key priorities for the UK R&D system.

Edited 20 Sept to make clear that the proposed opt-out from Pillar 3 of Horizon Europe only covers the European Innovation Council Fund. My thanks to Martin Smith for pointing this out.