How Sheffield became Steel City

For the first time for several decades, there are grounds for optimism about the future of Sheffield’s steel industry (very much reduced in scale though it now is). Sheffield Forgemasters (now UK state owned) is building a major new facility, and Special Melted Products (with an infusion of Taiwanese capital) is also expanding. This isn’t about the standard grades of steel for use in construction – the expansion is to meet demand for specialised forgings from speciality steels and other alloys, driven by applications in defense, aerospace, civil nuclear and energy, and influenced by a new focus on UK national resilience and industrial capacity. This gives me a pretext to republish this piece I wrote nearly ten years ago about the history of the steel industry in Sheffield – and the valuable lessons this history can teach us about innovation.

As someone interested in the history of innovation, I take great pleasure in seeing the many tangible reminders of the industrial revolution that are to be found where I live and work, in North Derbyshire and Sheffield. I get the impression that academics are sometimes a little snooty about local history, seeing it as the domain of amateurs and enthusiasts. If so, this would be a pity, because a deeper understanding of the histories of particular places could be helpful in providing some tests of, and illustrations for, the grand theories that are the currency of academics. I’ve recently read the late David Hey’s excellent “History of Sheffield”, and this prompted these reflections on what we can learn about the history of innovation from the example of this city, which became so famous for its steel industries. What can we learn from the rise (and fall) of steel in Sheffield?

Specialisation

“Ther was no man, for peril, dorste hym touche.
A Sheffeld thwitel baar he in his hose.”

The Reeves Tale, Canterbury Tales, Chaucer.

When the Londoner Geoffrey Chaucer wrote these words, in the late 14th century, the reputation of Sheffield as a place that knives came from (Thwitel = whittle: a knife) was already established. As early as 1379, 25% of the population of Sheffield were listed as metal-workers. This was a degree of focus that was early, and well developed, but not completely exceptional – the development of medieval urban economies in response to widening patterns of trade was already leading to specialisation based on the particular advantages location or natural resources gave them[1]. Towns like Halifax and Salisbury (and many others) were developing clusters in textiles, while other towns found narrower niches, like Burton-on-Trent’s twin trades of religious statuary and beer. Burton’s seemingly odd combination arose from the local deposits of gypsum [2]; what was behind Sheffield’s choice of blades?

I don’t think the answer to this question is at all obvious. Sheffield has deposits of ironstone, but that’s very common across England, so the early presence of iron smelting isn’t a great selective advantage. It has abundant water power, but again it is far from unique in this. What one can say is that knives are an obvious product for somewhere to specialise in at the developing stages of an economy. They are relatively small and portable, and thus relatively transported by packhorse or bagman from a place like Sheffield, which is distant from easy water transport. They have a very large market – everyone wants a knife, and Sheffield’s products were at the affordable end of the market. And making them clearly takes some degree of craft skill and some capital investment. So perhaps there isn’t much more to say that many places could have ended up as centres of knife making, but chance and contingency pointed to Sheffield.

But once a specialisation becomes established, the advantages are clear. Skills are passed from person to person, often down families. There is a degree of shared infrastructure – water mills owned by the land-owners drove grinding wheels and operated bellows and trip-hammers. What we’d call a supply chain developed, with raw materials being brought in, and networks to distribute the products across the country would form. And finally, as the Chaucer quote indicates, “Sheffield” soon became an identifiable nationwide brand, recognisable as the origin of choice for the concealed weapon of a bullying and violent miller.

Mobilisation of energy resources

Three sources of energy were important for the early cutlery industry in Sheffield and its near hinterland (traditionally known as Hallamshire) – water power, wood and coal. The river Don and its tributaries run fast off the steep flanks of the moors to the west of the city, fed by the ample Pennine rain. By the twelfth century, water mills were becoming widely used for industrial purposes across England. The introduction of water-powered trip-hammers mechanised the repetitive beating that was required to work iron, and the blades were sharpened and polished on water-powered grinding wheels. By 1637 400-500 workman were using these wheels. The steep, wooded hillsides rising from these rivers were ideal for the production of coppiced wood for conversion into charcoal, used for the production of iron and to heat the forges.

But Sheffield also lies on a coal-field, and outcroppings of the coal-seams would have been obvious in the sides of the gorges that the streams flowed through. These seams would have been easily followed and worked from surface pits. We know that coal-mining was already being conducted in a serious way at the time Chaucer was writing. A lease for a coal mine survives from 1398, specifying a rent to the land-owner of 20 marks a year [3]. The lease specifies the scale of the mine, which employed 4 underground workers, and was deep and extensive enough to require drainage by a sough. By 1540 John Leland could comment “Hallamshire hath plenti of woodde, and yet ther is burnid much se cole”. What was this “sea-coal” (so called to distinguish it from char-coal) being used for?

One thing we can be sure of is that it was not being mined for sale outside the region. Transport from Sheffield for bulk commodities was very difficult – the moors to the west would have been passable only on foot or by pack-horse, while the nearest navigable waterway was twenty difficult miles to the east, at Bawtrey wharf. Sheffield coal couldn’t compete on national markets with coal from Newcastle, which was mined on the banks of the Tyne and Wear, from which it could be loaded straight onto ships for export to London and elsewhere. Instead, Sheffield coal was for local use – as a substitute for charcoal, for heating forges and furnaces.

By 1672 Sheffield city had 224 metal-working smithies in the town itself, and another 376 in its Hallamshire hinterland. This scale of expansion was only made possible by the large-scale availability and use of coal as a substitute for charcoal. By this time all available woods were intensively coppiced, for white-coal (kiln-dried wood) and charcoal. White-coal and charcoal needed to be reserved for the more sensitive metallurgical operations that its sulphur content makes coal unsuitable for (smelting the lead from the nearby Derbyshire ore fields, in the case of white coal, and for the smelting iron and converting iron to steel for charcoal). These constraints on the use of coal as a substitute for charcoal were relaxed by the development of the coking process. Although the use of coke in iron-making is associated with Abraham Darby in Coalbrookedale in the early 18th century, its first large scale industrial use in England was recorded in 1640 in nearby Derby, for the drying of malt for beer. Certainly by the early 18th century coke was being extensively used in Sheffield in smiths’ hearths.

Meanwhile water power continued to grow in importance with the expansion of the industry; by 1660 at least 49 sites on the Don and its tributaries had been dammed for industrial purposes, with two thirds of these used for grinding wheels. By 1794 all sites for water wheels were occupied, & steam engines were being installed alongside the watermills to increase capacity, marking the point at which coal became the primary energy source for almost all aspects of the industry (some charcoal was still needed in the cementation process of making steel).

New technologies, new markets, new products

It wasn’t until the 18th century that Sheffield produced a radical innovation that had a significant impact on its industry; before that cutlers undoubtedly produced incremental improvements to their products and processes, and new techniques and technologies were adopted from elsewhere. One shouldn’t make the mistake of thinking that technological innovation only began in the 18th century in general, though, despite the impression one might get from reading some economists.

To go back to the beginning, using the methods of iron making developed in the Iron Age, experimental archaeology suggests that to produce a single kilogram of smithed bar iron would take 25 person days of work and 100 kg of charcoal [4]. By the fifteenth century, in the Weald, at the time the most advanced iron making region of England, a bloomery might produce about 14 kg of iron a day, using 110 kg of charcoal and the labour of 4 workers (mostly to operate the bellows) [5]. On top of this nearly 90-fold increase in productivity, the use of water-power increased productivity by another factor of 6. Another jump in productivity came with the introduction of blast furnaces from the continent in 1491 – early blast furnaces would produce 6 or 7 tonnes of iron in a 6 day run (though the much higher carbon content of pig iron compared to bloomery iron required further processing to convert it into wrought iron, done in a finery forge with charcoal heating and a water-powered trip-hammer).

This is a perhaps a digression in the industrial history of Sheffield, though. Sheffield was an iron-making region, though it wasn’t in the forefront even of the British industry. The cutlers of Sheffield had no hesitation in buying in better quality bar-iron from Spain and the Baltic to make their products. More relevant to the cutlery trade was the cementation process to convert bar-iron to steel in large batches. This had been invented in Germany in the 1580’s, introduced to Coalbrookdale in 1615, and reached Sheffield in 1709. The key point is that before the 18th century, Sheffield was an adopter of technology, not a creator (and for that matter, most of these techniques would have been familiar in China almost a millennium earlier).

This changed with the invention of crucible steel by Benjamin Huntsman, which provided the first way of producing steel of consistent quality at scale, by melting it in coke-fuelled furnaces. There are three things about Huntsman that are worth noting here. Firstly, his background – he was not a cutler or iron-master, he was a clockmaker. His motivation, then, was frustration at the shortcomings of the existing materials for fine work such as making springs. Secondly, he wasn’t from Sheffield. He moved from Doncaster to Sheffield in 1742, specifically to take advantage of Sheffield’s specialisation in steel and products made from it. Finally, it’s worth noting that having perfected his process and established a factory to make crucible steel in 1751, the local cutlers were not willing to use his material, as it wasn’t compatible with existing manufacturing processes.

Huntsman managed to keep his process secret for a decade or so, during which his material found success. It was exported to manufacturers elsewhere in England and abroad, it was used by the Sheffield cutlers, when they eventually adapted to the new material, and it provided the driving force for an expanding Sheffield tool-making industry. Crucible steel wasn’t the only innovation in materials at the time; in 1743 Thomas Boulsover invented a method for fusing a coating of silver onto a body of copper, to make what became known as “old Sheffield plate”. This allowed the development of a large market in lower cost flatware [6] and hollow-ware – silver plated forks and spoons, candlesticks, snuff-boxes, coffee pots and so on – to fulfil the rising demand for affordable luxuries from an expanding middle class.

The development of a new Atlantic empire also provided new markets – the slave plantations of the Caribbean and the Americas were equipped with plantation knives and machetes made in Sheffield. After independence, the USA continued to be a major market, many Sheffield companies had agents there, and new products were designed in response to its demands. One colourful example from the 1830’s was the Bowie knife – an icon of the old West, but largely made in England. Bowie knives were a centre-piece of the catalogues that were produced for the American market, and best-sellers right up to the time when they began to be superseded by handguns as the preferred artefact for interpersonal violence, from the 1850’s onward. Even as the capacity of the USA’s own industry grew, much of the tool steel for their machine shops came from Sheffield, with as much as one third of Sheffield’s steel output being exported across the Atlantic in the first half of the 19th century.

The “second industrial revolution” – state power and the invention of R&D

Industrialisation in England and the development of the USA between them fuelled a substantial expansion of the Sheffield steel industry in the first half of the 19th century. But it was another technological innovation that transformed steel from being a material for making small, high value artefacts to building the infrastructure of the modern world – in railways, bridges, ships and sky-scrapers. In 1856, Henry Bessemer announced the invention of a new way of converting pig iron into steel. The Bessemer converter converted 25 tonnes of iron into steel in half an hour; it reduced the price of steel by a factor of five and greatly increased the volumes produced. Like Huntsman before him, Bessemer moved to Sheffield to build a factory to implement his invention. Unlike Huntsman, he encouraged other manufacturers to build Bessemer converters of their own, under license.

The railway booms in England and the USA provided massive markets for the new mass-produced steel, but Sheffield’s first-mover advantage didn’t last long. Within a decade or two, competition from other parts of the UK and from a rapidly developing US steel industry, together with a slowing of the railway boom, made life harder for the new, industrial scale Sheffield steel makers. They chose to respond by moving up-market, making innovative, higher quality alloy steels, for higher value markets.

In this they were helped by three factors. Firstly, a new process for making steel – the Siemens open hearth process, developed in South Wales by 1870, was rapidly adopted in Sheffield. This was slower than the Bessemer process to make steel – it took 10-12 hours to convert a 100 tonne batch. But the quality of the steel was higher, and significantly it was possible to analyse the material as it was being converted, to do in-line quality control. Secondly, an important new market had appeared. The late nineteenth century saw a naval arms race between Britain and Germany, with bigger, more heavily armed ships being built, and more powerful guns and armour-piercing shells being made in response. Sheffield firms dominated these new, government driven markets for armour plate and guns, which accounted for much of the expansion of the industry in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The third factor was the development of a scientific understanding of the metallurgy of steel. It’s fair to say that until the mid-nineteenth century, innovation in steel had been pretty much entirely empirical. It was a Sheffield scientist who changed this. Henry Sorby was the son of a wealthy Sheffield family, and he used his private income to support a career as a gentleman scientist. He made distinguished contributions to geology and natural history, for which he was elected to the Royal Society, but his biggest contribution – both to Sheffield and science more widely – was the invention of the techniques of metallographic microscopy, in 1863.

Formal institutions in support of science-led innovation were slow to arrive in Sheffield. Traditionally, the industry was regulated by the Company of Cutlers in Hallamshire – a guild incorporated in 1624, whose traditional purpose was to control entry to the trade by apprenticeship. It’s fair to say that the Cutlers’ Company is a guardian of standards and protector and advocate of the Sheffield brand, rather than a promoter of innovation [7]. A Mechanics Institute was set up in 1832, though the motivation for this seems to have been as a response to the political unrest of the time as much as a desire for improvement through education. It wasn’t until the late nineteenth century that technical education was pursued seriously, through the foundation of Firth College in 1879, and Sheffield Technical School in 1884. It was these institutions, promoted both by Henry Sorby and a local steelmaker, Mark Firth, that in 1905 came together with the medical school to form the University of Sheffield, which from the outset had a strongly technical character [8].

The key innovations, however, took place in industry. In 1882, Robert Hadfield invented Manganese steel, an alloy which maintains its toughness on hardening, has very high impact strength and great resistance to wear. Another steel alloy invented in Sheffield achieved even greater prominence: stainless steel. Harry Brearley discovered this chromium alloy of steel in 1912, while looking for a material able to resist the hot and corrosive environment found inside the barrels of rifles and naval guns. The applications in Sheffield’s traditional, and still important, cutlery industry were very quickly realised. Brearley’s discovery was refined by William Hatfield, who developed the mostly widely used modern grade of stainless steel, 18/8.

It’s worth stepping back from these individual inventions to consider the institutional framework in which they were made. Robert Hadfield was, like Sorby, the gifted son of a local manufacturer. Having decided to stay in the steel industry rather than going to University, his father encouraged him to set up a laboratory. When his father died, he took over the business, but continued, in effect, both to lead its research and development activities and to contribute personally as a scientist, as well as running the company. He collaborated extensively with academic scientists throughout Europe, and was elected to the Royal Society in 1909. Harry Brearley, on the other hand, was an employee – a steel-worker’s son who left school at 14 to become a labourer, and became a bottle-washer in the chemical laboratory in Thomas Firth’s steel-works. From there, he was able to learn enough science at evening classes to rise to a leadership position in a new R&D laboratory jointly supported by two Sheffield steel companies, Firth and Brown. After his discovery of stainless steel he left the Brown-Firth laboratories with some bitterness about the patent rights, and his place was taken by William Hatfield, who had a doctorate in metallurgy (presumably one of the first) from the newly chartered University of Sheffield [10].

Between 1880 and 1918, then, industrial research and development had become institutionalised in the Sheffield steel industry. It was personally supported by the leading capitalists in the industry, institutions were in place to supply skilled scientists and technicians, and its activities were integrated into wider national and international scientific networks.

What was the cause of Sheffield’s steel pre-eminence?

The few years between the end of the first world war and the economic troubles of the 1930’s were probably the high water mark for steel in Sheffield – in the area of high performance alloy steels, its major rivals in Germany were engulfed in the chaos after the war, which itself had provided a massive and lucrative market for Sheffield’s steel industry. Its tools and cutlery industries had buoyant worldwide markets, helped by favourable treatment in Britain’s expansive overseas empire and dominions. What was the cause that led a small, provincial town to such world dominance of a major industrial sector?

Of course, there was no single cause – there were many causes, operating differently at different points in the city’s history, often reinforcing each other, usually amplifying the effects of chance and contingency. In this narrative, I’ve discussed all these as contributory factors at various times:

  • the benefits of agglomeration,
  • the ready availability of water power
  • the early exploitation of coal, to relieve the constraints of an organic economy
  • a culture of innovation
  • the opening of new, colonial markets
  • the British government as a driver of technology through armaments and the arms race with Germany
  • science-led technological advances
  • the institutions for science led technology, particularly industrial R&D and technical education
  • The point goes beyond the fact that there were multiple causes, it is that these different causes were often mutually reinforcing. For example, the availability of water power contributed to the specialisation of the area in edged tools, but it was the early exploitation of coal that permitted a concentration of industry that hugely exceeded the constraints that the availability of wood and water power would otherwise have imposed. It was this concentration that drove a contagious culture of innovation, and then these innovations (e.g. Old Sheffield Plate, Huntsman’s crucible steel) in turn drove demand for yet more energy, met by the locally mined coal. It seems to me that it is understanding this process of interaction and mutual reinforcement of multiple causal factors that is essential for understanding the industrialisation of Britain.

    [1] See Dyer, Making a Living in the Middle Ages
    [2] Gypsum is calcium sulphate, which in the form of alabaster makes a soft, white, easily worked rock ideal for mass production of statues. Its presence in ground-water makes it particularly suitable for making bright, clear beers which store and travel well (I know that in this time of craft beer I’m in the dwindling minority of consumers who, rather than wanting to be overwhelmed by the crude taste of hops, prefer their beer to taste of sulphur, as is characteristic of the finest, most traditional Burton bitter).
    [3] 20 marks is £13 6s 8d. This corresponds to about £9,000 in today’s money correcting for price inflation, about £95,000 relative to average wages.
    [4] P. Crew, quoted in Barry Cunliffe’s Iron Age Communities of Britain (“Lovely boy, arrow climber” – yes, that Peter Crew).
    [5] The Iron Industry of the Weald, H. Cleere and D. Crossley
    [6] In the traditional nomenclature of Sheffield, cutlery refers to tools with an edge – knives, razors, scalpels, scissors, scythes and so on. Forks and spoons, not having sharpened edges, don’t count as cutlery – they’re flat-ware.
    [7] The Company of Cutlers in Hallamshire is still going strong, now representing all with an interest in manufacturing in the Sheffield region.
    [8] There had been an earlier attempt by the nascent institution to join the federal Victoria University, which in the late 19th century comprised what were to become the Universities of Manchester, Leeds and Liverpool. Sheffield’s application to join was rejected because of its perceived over-emphasis on engineering and other technical subjects, rather than the classics and humanities. In any case, the partnership fell apart in the early 20th century, with Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds all becoming independent institutions.
    [9] Inventors in the USA and Germany were working to develop non-rusting steels using very similar approaches, and Brearley’s priority is disputed by some. But, to use a phrase I picked up from a colleague about a more recent discovery, “he may not have invented it first, but he invented it best.
    [10] Here I’ve drawn on information in the Royal Society’s obituary notices for Robert Hadfield and William Hatfield.

    The place of UK business in the global R&D scoreboard

    My last post looked at the growth in UK government support for R&D over the last decade. But if we are interested in restoring economic growth (as we should be, given the ongoing economic stagnation that the UK has been suffering), it’s R&D carried out by businesses that is more immediately relevant in terms of its direct effect on productivity growth, through the development of new, high value goods and services, and through making existing processes more efficient.  This post takes a look at R&D done by UK-owned businesses, taking a snapshot in the year 2024.

    First, I’ll pose two similar-looking questions.  First, how much R&D do UK-owned businesses do?  Second, how much R&D is done by businesses in the UK?

    The best answer we have to the first question – how much R&D do UK-owned businesses do? – is £32.1 billion.  This comes from the EU R&D scoreboard, which uses publicly available data to list and rank the world’s top 2000 R&D performing companies.  According to the scoreboard, the world total of business spending on R&D from these 2000 companies in 2024 was £1.2 trillion, so the share of this total done by UK companies is about 2.7%.

    For the second question – how much R&D is done by businesses in the UK? – we turn to the ONS’s survey of Business Enterprise R&D, the BERD survey.  For 2024, this gives a total business R&D spend of £55.6 billion.

    Continue reading “The place of UK business in the global R&D scoreboard”

    Rock climbing and the economics of innovation (revisited)

    The rock-climber Alex Honnold is in the news again, thanks to his live, televised ascent of a skyscraper in Taiwan.  This gives me an excuse to recycle this post from October 2019.  Here I explain that just because Honnold climbs without a rope, that doesn’t mean that his achievement doesn’t rely on technological progress over many decades, contrary to the claim of a well-known economist.

    The rock climber Alex Honnold’s free, solo ascent of El Capitan is inspirational in many ways. For economist John Cochrane, watching the film of the ascent has prompted a blogpost: “What the success of rock climbing tells us about economic growth”. He concludes that “Free Solo is a great example of the expansion of ability, driven purely by advances in knowledge, untethered from machines.” As an amateur in both rock climbing and innovation theory, I can’t resist some comments of my own. I think it’s all a bit more complicated than Cochrane thinks. In particular his argument that Honnold’s success tells us that knowledge – and the widespread communication of knowledge – is more important than new technology in driving economic growth doesn’t really stand up.

    The film “Free Solo” shows Honnold’s 2017 ascent of the 3000 ft cliff El Capitan, in the Yosemite Valley, California. The climb was done free (i.e. without the use of artificial aids like pegs to make progress), and solo – without ropes or any other aids to safety. How come, Cochrane asks, rock climbers have got so much better at climbing since El Cap’s first ascent in 1958, which took 47 days, done with “siege tactics” and every artificial aid available at the time? “There is essentially no technology involved. OK, Honnold wears modern climbing boots, which have very sticky rubber. But that’s about it. And reasonably sticky rubber has been around for a hundred years or so too.”

    Hold on a moment here – no technology? I don’t think the history of climbing really bears this out. Even the exception that Cochrane allows, sticky rubber boots, is more complicated than he thinks. Continue reading “Rock climbing and the economics of innovation (revisited)”

    Anglofuturism and the Shock of the Old

    As the UK endures the second decade of its crisis of economic stagnation, a loose group of commentators, activists and think-tanks have emerged to argue that this stagnation isn’t inevitable, and to call for more houses and infrastructure to be built, for energy to be cheaper and more abundant, and for a restoration of the technological optimism of earlier times.  It’s not an entirely homogenous movement – some call themselves “Anglofuturists”, others organise under the banners of “progress” and “abundance”.  As I wrote a year ago in my piece “Taking Anglofuturism seriously”, I am sympathetic to some of the goals of this movement. I agree that our economic stagnation isn’t inevitable and that the UK’s physical infrastructure needs upgrading, I regret the failure of recent new nuclear build plans, and I think that technological innovation is a key driver of productivity growth.  Yet to me there seems to be a gap in the movement between willing the ends and identifying the means, with the suggested remedy all too often coming down simply to calls to deregulate more and reform the planning laws.

    There is perhaps a lesson from history here, emphasised by some comments the historian David Edgerton made in a podcast last week.  The kind of nation that Anglofuturists call for looks rather like what was delivered by post-war British governments between 1950 and 1980.  Then, the UK was one of the most R&D intensive economies in the world, with a cross-party consensus that technological innovation would deliver economic growth.  Despite persistent national soul-searching about a ruling-class trained in the humanities, a number of scientists and engineers rose to powerful and influential positions.  The world’s first nuclear power station was designed and built in just four years, following which there was a large-scale roll out of nuclear power stations. A national capability for launching satellites was developed (and subsequently abandoned).  This period saw the construction of most of our current motorway network, and, as my plot shows, new houses were built at a rate that has never since been matched.  In this sense there is a certain retro quality to Anglofuturism, a harking back to a time when the UK seemed to look to the future with technological self-confidence.

    Continue reading “Anglofuturism and the Shock of the Old”

    Putting fusion power on the UK grid

    The UK government has a very ambitious plan for nuclear fusion, which I don’t think is widely enough known about.  The plan is to build a pilot nuclear fusion plant able to deliver electrical power to the grid by 2040 – the Spherical Tokamak for Energy Production (STEP).  The project was launched in 2019, and the current government has guaranteed funding for it at the very significant level of £500m a year for five years. 

    At a time when many people from different political positions agree that a big problem of the UK state is its inability to deliver big projects, this is a huge investment to build state technological capacity.  

    This post is a brief introduction to the STEP project.  Nuclear fusion does generate some reflexive scepticism – we all know the jokes: “it’s twenty years in the future, and always will be”. I want to get beyond that, while still being realistic about the huge challenges this programme faces. I’ll describe some of the technological and engineering issues, and the approaches being proposed to overcome them.

    Continue reading “Putting fusion power on the UK grid”

    The Year in Soft Machines

    The Soft Machines blog has been going for more than twenty years, I’m astonished to say. It’s good to see a substantial increase in the number of readers in 2025’s later months – no doubt helped by the fact that, with a bit more time on my hands, I’ve been writing a bit more regularly. For the benefit of new readers and old, here’s a review of some of the year’s posts, set in the context of some of this blog’s recurring themes.

    The UK’s productivity and economic growth problem

    The UK’s continuing economic stagnation remains a continual preoccupation, unfortunately. A recent post presents the most recent data for GDP per capita, showing that the country is around 30% worse off than if the pre-2008 trend had continued. Such a dramatic change in economic fortunes must have a cause – or causes. Stating what should be obvious, but doesn’t seem to be, to many commentators, I insist that the causes must precede the big break in 2008, and that there may be long lags between cause and effect. But one can always make things worse with subsequent bad decisions.

    The UK’s continuing economic growth crisis

    Fundamentally, our economic problems are problems of productivity growth – or lack of it. I’ve been writing about this for about a decade, with a post from earlier in the year summarising some of the arguments:

    Ten Years of Banging on about Productivity

    Why does this matter? From the government’s perspective, projections of future productivity growth make a big difference to how much public spending can grow or how much taxes have to rise to keep the government within its fiscal rules. The role of the Office of Budgetary Responsibility in making forecasts is key here, but its record in predicting future productivity growth is frankly risible, as I discussed in the context of the Spring Statement:

    Why productivity growth is important – Spring Statement 2025 Edition

    Productivity and GDP per capita are technical concepts, so it might be thought that these issues aren’t relevant to people’s everyday lives. Nothing could be further from the truth – the slowdown in productivity is directly reflected in peoples’ earnings, shown dramatically in this plot from:

    The End of Wage Growth in the UK

    Average real weekly UK wages. Green: Composite Average Weekly Earnings series, corrected for inflation using consumer prices index. Thomas, R and Dimsdale, N (2017) “A Millennium of UK Data”, Bank of England OBRA dataset. Brown: ONS, Real Average Weekly Earnings, total pay, using CPI (seasonally adjusted). 18/2/2025 release.

    Everything that’s wrong with politics and economics in the UK can be traced back to stagnating productivity.

    Towards economic growth, energy and progress

    Is this economic stagnation inevitable? I don’t think so – I believe it to be the result of policy choices the country has made, and different choices are possible. I welcome a growing movement of commentators and think-tanks exploring concrete policy ideas to break the stagnation, though I don’t always agree with their priorities. At the end of last year, I wrote what I hope comes across as a sympathetic critique of one strand of thought –

    Taking Anglofuturism Seriously

    One theme that is at the centre of much of this kind of writing prioritises cheap, abundant energy, with a new roll-out of nuclear power put centre-stage. I’m in sympathy with this, though I don’t think the analysis of the recent failure of the UK to build new nuclear power stations goes far enough. In 2014, the government planned to build 18 GW of new nuclear power; as I write, none has been delivered, and only 3.2 GW is under construction. Much emphasis is placed on the need to remove regulatory barriers; this in my view is necessary, but not sufficient: more thought needs to be given to how to rebuild national capabilities, as I argue here:

    Ownership, Control, National capability: learning lessons from the UK’s nuclear new build debacle

    Another recent feature of the UK economy is a rapid decline in the share of the economy accounted for by manufacturing – a decline shared by other developed economies, but which has been particularly large in the UK. Manufacturing now accounts for 8% of UK economy; should we try & increase this? I think so, but it’s important to distinguish some good arguments for this from bad ones (and recognise some uncertainties). Manufacturing matters for its potential for productivity growth – what’s important is the value it creates, not the jobs. Manufacturing capability is also important for national security, but realism is needed about UK’s position as <3% of world high tech economy – we need to aim for security, not autarky.

    Good reasons and bad reasons for supporting manufacturing (and some uncertainties) 

    On artificial intelligence

    Inevitably, I have written about artificial intelligence. I don’t think anyone knows how this story is going to play out, least of all me, so back in May I sketched out three scenarios for the economic impact of AI:

    1. Intelligence explosion – the Silicon Valley vision of AI entering a state of recursive self-improvement, leading to artificial general intelligence, and a winner takes all economy, in which the controllers of the new technologies enjoy unprecedented political and economic power.

    2. Excel in prose – in which AI is understood as a powerful normal technology, whose applications lead to significant productivity gains across a number of sectors, but with a delay as business processes have to be adapted to make the most of the new technology.

    3. Crash and burn – in which the revenues generated by applications of AI are disappointing, and can’t justify the huge capital investments have been made in AI infrastructure. The subsequent bursting of a financial bubble leads to systemic damage to the world financial system and the real economy.

    Writing in May, I described “Crash and burn” as a contrarian scenario, but in the last few months it seems to have become mainstream; one can’t open up the Financial Times app without coming across an AI Bubble article.

    The economic impact of AI: three scenarios  

    One aspect of the AI story that I think has been neglected is the state of the material base that underlies the technology – the integrated circuits that are used to train and run the AI models. For many decades, we came to rely on an exponential increase in computer power, arising from the miniaturisation of the circuit components expressed in Moore’s Law.

    Moore’s Law is still evoked by commentators as a symbol of accelerating technological change, but in fact the rate of increase in raw computer power has slowed substantially over the last two decades. Available computer power for applications such as large language models is still increasing, but this increased power is coming, less from miniaturisation, more from software, specialised architectures optimised for particular tasks, and advanced packaging of chips.

      Minimum transistor footprint (product of metal pitch and contacted gate pitch) for successive semiconductor process nodes. Data: (1994 – 2014 inclusive) – Stanford Nanoelectronics Lab, post 2017 and projections, successive editions of the IEEE International Roadmap for Devices and Systems

    In the classical heyday of Moore’s Law, from the mid 1980’s to the mid 2000’s, computer power grew at a rate of 50% a year compounded, doubling every two years. In this extraordinary period, there was more than a thousandfold cumulative increase over a couple of decades.

    Now, in contrast, it is not the supply of computer power that is increasing exponentially; we have an exponential increase in demand, while the increase in supply has more of a linear character.

    Moore’s Law, past and future 

    In “AI and the manufacturing firm of the future”, I ask how AI will change ht world of manufacturing. Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, has written about a manufacturing singularity, with AGI powered humanoid robots building factories to make more robots. I ask, as politely as I can, whether this vision reflects his lack of understanding of the material base of our industrial world, is a somewhat overheated metaphor, or is just bullshit (in Harry Frankfurt’s sense – i.e. an utterance whose intended effect is uncoupled to any truth value).

    An alternative scenario is of AI driving process & system optimisation in increasingly automated factories. If Altman’s vision is driving strategies in the USA, I think the latter scenario is the one being aggressively pursued in China. We’ll see which is closer to reality.

    AI and the manufacturing firm of the future 

    UK science and university policy

    Until my retirement at the end of September this year it was very much part of my day job to think about science and university policy in the UK. UK Universities have been under huge financial pressure in recent years, so some might be tempted to step back from their role in their communities. In this piece I argued that this would be a big mistake, and instead they should take even more seriously their role supporting regional economies.

    The civic university in hard times 

    The next piece offers a much more personal view of the role of universities in their regions – it’s a retrospective on my time as Vice-President for Regional Innovation and Civic Engagement at the University of Manchester, reviewing the progress we have made working with partners in the city-region to realise the University’s potential to support Greater Manchester’s economy.

    On leaving the University of Manchester

    Finally, my most popular post of the year was this rather provocative piece: UK Science in a post-liberal world. Here, I argue that a multi-decade period of consensus in UK science policy is likely soon to come to an end, and that the UK’s research system must respond to a new focus on re-building, re-energising, re-arming and re-industrialising for a changed & hostile world.

    UK Science in a post-liberal world 

    Family matters

    To turn to personal matters, my mother, Sheila Jones, died on October 31st this year, a little more than two years after the death of my father, Robbie Jones. I found it helpful to write these two pieces to celebrate their lives, and to reflect on where I have come from.

    Sheila Howell Jones (1934 – 2025) ,  Robert Cecil Jones (1932 – 2023) 

    AI and the manufacturing firm of the future

    How will artificial intelligence change the world of manufacturing?  Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, has no doubt that the effect will be transformational [1]:

    “If we have to make the first million humanoid robots the old-fashioned way, but then they can operate the entire supply chain—digging and refining minerals, driving trucks, running factories, etc.—to build more robots, which can build more chip fabrication facilities, data centers, etc, then the rate of progress will obviously be quite different.”

    It’s difficult to know what to make of this vision.  Taking it at face value, it seems to represent a profoundly unimaginative view of the future, in which there is a straight replacement of workers in factories by humanoid robots.  Factory automation has developed hugely since my brief period as a production line worker in 1980, but this hasn’t occurred by a one-for-one replacement of people by robots.  

    Most people have seen pictures of modern car factories, with robot arms carrying out repeated operations like welding with great precision.  But, as Tim Minshall explains in his excellent book on manufacturing [2], robots are just one example of the many devices that can carry out physical operations in an automated factory.  If you are automating a chemical factory, you don’t do it by getting a humanoid robot to open the valves and stir the tanks.  The most sophisticated factories that currently exist – the chip fabrication facilities that produce the GPUs that underpin AI, as well as the CPUs in our phones and computers – are almost entirely automated.  In the fab, a silicon wafer goes through hundreds of complex process steps without being handled by a human – but the robots that move the wafers from tool to tool run on wheels, not legs.

    So is Altman just saying that automation makes capital goods cheaper, and that leads to a self-reinforcing process of increasing productivity? That’s certainly true, but it’s a process that is neither new, nor having much to do with large language models or generative AI.

    Continue reading “AI and the manufacturing firm of the future”

    Sheila Howell Jones (1934-2025)

    Sheila Jones, my mother, died on Friday 31 October 2025.  Born and raised in West Wales, she spent much of adulthood in England, as a primary teacher in a variety of schools. She returned to Wales when her husband, Robbie Jones, became a priest in the Anglican Church in Wales, finally moving to Derbyshire to be close to her son’s family.

    Sheila Jones, née Lewis, was born in the Pembrokeshire village of Letterston.  Her father, John Lewis, was one of thirteen children of Arnold and Alice Lewis.  Arnold Lewis was an agricultural merchant – and, by all accounts, something of a domestic tyrant.  He assigned careers to all his sons; John was to be a priest, and was sent to train in St David’s College, Lampeter. Rebelling against this, John dropped out of theological college to become a Conservative Party activist.

    Continue reading “Sheila Howell Jones (1934-2025)”

    What makes a manufacturing superpower?

    Some reflections on Breakneck: China’s quest to engineer the future by Dan Wang.

    Dan Wang’s new book on China is rightly getting great reviews. It’s a compelling read, engagingly written, reflecting both the author’s deep understanding of China’s developing economy, and his personal sympathy with the Chinese nation. It is admiring of Chinese achievements over the last couple of decades , while being entirely clear-eyed about the deficiencies of the political system and its human costs.

    The big idea behind the book is to compare and contrast the two great powers of the world today – China and the USA, summarising that comparison in a neat formula. For Wang, China is the Engineering State, while the USA is the Lawyerly Society – and from that contrast, the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the two nations can be derived.

    What kind of state is China? According to Wang, it is a “Leninist Technocracy with Grand Opera tendencies”.

    Continue reading “What makes a manufacturing superpower?”

    Another Modern Industrial Strategy

    This is a slightly expanded version of an article published last week in Research Professional – The latest industrial strategy has made choices

    Last week’s Industrial Strategy Policy Paper is the latest chapter in the chequered history of UK Industrial Strategies. For nearly three decades after Thatcher’s ascent to power, the UK’s strategy was not to have an industrial strategy, which was a concept associated with money-losing supersonic airliners and cars with square steering wheels. But that conventional wisdom has been challenged by a global financial crisis and nearly two decades of economic stagnation, so after a number of stops and starts over the last decade, a fully developed Industrial Strategy has now arrived. Continue reading “Another Modern Industrial Strategy”